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( A ope a 1 from M.D. Pa ~ 
~Muir) ~
Federal/Civil Timely (w/ 
extn) 
1. SUMMARY: Appees refused, for religious reasons, to ob- / -tain a social security number for their daughter and to provide 
that number to the state welfare agency. Because provision of 
this information is a statutory prerequisite to receiving bene-
fits for the daughter under federal-state welfare programs, the 
state agency 
~ -Pn ~.~;u' o. Je"'-S~ v. 
- L-disC~- ~;~ L. 
tending that the application of the statutory requirement violat-
j 
·I 
ed their rights under the Free Exercise Clause, a~d the DC 
agreed. 
2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: Appee Roy is a Native Amer-
- ----
ican descended from the Abenaki Tribe. A central part of Roy's 
religious beliefs concerns the legend of Katahdin, which warns of 
the "great evil." Roy has interpreted this legend to be a warn--
ing about the use of com uters. He considers social security 
numbers (SSNs) to be part of the "great evil," because they are 
"used by computers," and he believes that such use robs the spir-
it of the person identified by the number. He ascribes this ef-
feet to any unique numerical identifier that is used by a comput-
er. 
Under 7 u.s.c. §2025(e) and 42 u.s.c. §602(a) (25) , 1 house-
holds participating in the food stamp and AFDC programs must fur-
nish their state welfare agencies with the SSN of each member of 
the household. Appee Roy and his wife, appee Miller, were re-
ceiving aid for their children under these programs when, in ----April 1982, state welfare personnel informed them that they had 
failed to provide aSSN for their (then) two-year-old daughter, 
Little Bird of the Snow. Roy refused to obtain and provide a SSN 
for Little Bird of the Snow because of his religiously motivated 
fear that use of this number by the government's computers would 
1The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 
Stat. 494, moved the SSN requirement of the AFDC program from 42 
u.s.c. 602(a) (25) to a new section of the Social Security Act. 
See 98 Stat., at 1147. 
( 
rob her spirit and prevent her from attaining "gr~ater power." 
Because of this refusal, the state agency termina~ed the benefits 
for Little Bird of the Snow under the AFDC program and initiated 
proceedings to discontinue food stamps for Little Bird of the 
Snow. 
Appees then commenced this suit against the Sec. of the Pa. 
Dept. of Public Welfare, 2 the Sec. of HHS, and the Sec. of Agri-
culture, challenging the constitutionality of the SSN requirement 
as applied in their case. ~he case was tried on the assumption 
that Little Bird of the Snow did not have a SSN and that it would 
violate Roy's beliefs to obtain one for her, but on the last day 
of trial it came out that appee Miller had obtained a SSN for 
Little Bird of the Snow shortly after the daughter's birth. _____. 
The DC held for appees. It first rejected appts' suggestion 
that the case became moot once it was learned that Little Bird of 
the Snow already had a SSN. The court reasoned that Roy's reli-
~I \\ 
gious objection went more to the use of the SSN than to its mere 
establishment, and that appees' desire to obtain welfare benefits 
without the government's using Little Bird of the Snow's SSN 
saved the case from mootness. The court then concluded that 
Roy's beliefs were religious in nature and sincerely held. 
2Defendant Cohen, the Sec. of the Pa. welfare agency, did not 
appeal the DC's judgment. This memo's statement of the facts 
refers to all three defendants simply as "appts." Cohen has 
filed a very brief "response" in support of the jurisdictional 
statement. Because this response says nothing that is not said 
better by the jurisdictional statement, this memo does not 
discuss separately the response's contentions. 
/ 
The DC next examined the governmental inter~sts at stake. 
' It acknowledged that the SSN requirement furthere~ the "substan-
tial" governmental interests in preventing welfare fraud and 
abuse and in facilitating accurate and efficient identification 
'-"" 
of recipients and calculation of benefits. Nevertheless, the DC 
a religious exemption from the requirement. The DC 
~-----""""'\ 
applied the following test in reaching this conclusion: 
"[T]he Plaintiffs [may] prevail on their free exercise claim 
only if they ••• show that the governmental interests served 
by the social security number requirement could be served by 
some reasonable alternative means which would not burden the 
Plaintiffs' first amendment rights. In other words, if 
holding that the Plaintiffs' objection to the social securi-
ty number requirement entitles them to an exemption from the 
requirement would substantially burden the benefit programs 
involved in this case by, for example, involving a cost so 
great that the efficient operation of the programs would be 
effected or by creating a substantial likelihood of chaos in 
the system resulting from a proliferation of claims to ex-
emptions from the requirement, then the governments' inter-
est should be held superior to the Plaintiffs' right to ex-
ercise their religious beliefs." Id., at 16a (emphasis in 
original). ---
Because the nature of Roy's belief is so unusual, the DC --...,. 
~ reasoned, no more than a handful of persons would be likely to 
request exemptions like that requested by Roy. "Thus, the Gov-
ernment's general interest in enforcement of the social security 
number requirement would not appear to be threatened by a holding 
in favor of the Plaintiffs in this case." Id., at 18a-19a. Fur-
ther, the governmental interest in denying the particular exemp-
tion requested here is insignificant. There was no evidence that 
anyone else receiving welfare benefits was using the name Little 
Bird of the Snow, and other data in the girl's computer file 
(e.g., date of birth) could also be used for cross-matching of 
.. 
computer files to prevent fraud or abuse. 3 
I 
The DC concluded that appees were constituti+nally entitled 
to the exemption requested. It enjoined appts from denying bene-
fits to appees for Little Bird of the Snow because of appees' 
failure to provide aSSN for her. The court also enjoined appt 
Heckler from using or disseminating the SSN already assigned to 
Little Bird of the Snow, and it ordered her to "notify any agen-
cy, individual, business entity or other third party to which the 
number has been provided and demand that said agency permanently 
refrain from: (1) making any use of the number and (2) dissemi-
nating the number to any other agency, person, individual, busi-
ness entity, or any other third party." App. to Pet. for Cert. 
24a-25a. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Appts contend that the DC erred by consid-
ering appees' claim in isolation and ignoring the compelling 
"programmatic governmental interests" in verifying eligibility, 
preventing and detecting fraud, and promoting efficient adminis-
trat'on of massive government programs. The DC's analysis runs 
counter to that of United States v. Lee u.s. 252 (1982), 
from paying social security taxes for his mish employees. In 
that case, the Court did not confine its nalysis to the effect 
3Roy's religious beliefs are not of ended by computer 
processing of a file on his daught r that uses her name as the 
identifier for the file: Roy beli es that his daughter's name 
will protect her from evil. 
Instead, it looked to the government's compelling interest in 
I 
I 
uniform administration of the program and of tax collection in 
I 
general and concluded that mandatory participation by all employ-
ers was essential to the fiscal vitality of the program. See 
id., at 258-260. See also Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 u.s. 599, 608 
(1961): Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 u.s. 158 (1944). The perti-
nent point, according to appts, is that the AFDC and food stamp 
programs as a whole cannot be managed effectively without the SSN 
requirement: it is not relevant that granting exemptions in rare 
cases might work only a minute or incremental interference with 
the governmental interest. 
The appts also argue that, under the DC's reasoning, indi-
viduals with the most idiosyncratic beliefs enjoy the strongest 
entitlement to accommodation, because the burden of accommodating 
such beliefs will be less than that of accommodating beliefs more 
widely held. Appts consider such a result anomalous. Similarly, 
appts suggest that there would be no limit to the accommodations 
that could be required of the government under the DC's analysis. 
A welfare recipient with religious objections to the use of num-
bers on checks could insist that the government pay him by cash. 
Viewing each case in isolation, as the DC's approach requires, 
the government would be obliged to accede to these types of de-
mands, because it clearly could do so in a handful of instances 
without undue burden and expense. 
Finally, appts assert that the DC's relief is overbroad in-
sofar as it enjoins Sec. Heckler from using or disseminating Lit-
tle Bird of the Snow's SSN. No decision of this Court holds that 
the Free Exercise Clause protects an individual ~rom having his 
I 
religious sensibilities offended by observing actl ons of govern-
ment to which he objects. 
that the government's interest in 
preventing we are fraud and abuse is not a compelling governmen-
tal interest, and they cite Sherbert and Thomas as support for 
this proposition. 
Second, appees assert that appts' dispute essentially is 
with the DC's "finding of fact" that the government's interest 
can be adequately served w~ng a SSN for Little Bird 
of the Snow. The government's ability to connuct computer 
searches is irrelevant, because it is undisputed that Little Bird 
of the Snow is eligible for the benefits claimed, and in any 
event the DC found that the government could effectively conduct 
computer searches for Little Bird of the Snow without a SSN for 
her. Because the DC's "finding of fact" is not clearly errone-
ous, appts' contentions do not present a substantial federal 
question. As a more general matter, allowing religious exemp-
tions from the SSN requirement will not hamper the operation of 
the welfare programs, because, as the DC found, a person's file 
can be adequately identified by the other data in the file and 
there is no significant threat of a proliferation of claims to 
exemptions from the SSN requirement. Thus, appts are incorrect 
in asserting that the DC failed to consider the "programmatic" 
interests of the government. In addition, the small number of 
potential claims for religious exemptions distinguishes this case 
from United States v • hich emphasized the risk of "myriad 
. ',· 
77 
exceptions flowin from a wide variety of religious beliefs." 
I ---· -----...._,. __ 
455 u.s., at 260. 
Third, appees point out that the DC's decision is consistent 
with the decisions of other courts that have addressed the same 
issue. See Callahan v. Woods, 736 F.2d 1269 (CA9 1984): Stevens 
v. Berger, 428 F.Supp. 896 (EDNY 1977): Atwood v. Idaho Dept. of 
Health & Welfare, No. 83-3066 (D. Idaho Oct. 16, 1984) (denying 
government's motion for summary judgment). But see Mullaney v. 
Woods, 158 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1979). 
Fourth, the DC's reasoning is faithful to the principle es-
tablished by this Court's precedent that religious accommodation 
must be made as long as the accommodation does not undermine the 
purpose of the statutory requirement. Thomas, Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and Sherbert required accommodation 
for this reason. Similarly, in Lee, Braunfeld, and Prince, the 
Court rejected Free Exercise claims for accommodation because the 
requested exemption would itself undermine the relevant statutory 
purpose. As noted above, the DC concluded that granting a reli-
gious exemption from the SSN requirement would not impair the 
purposes of the requirement. 
Fifth, appees assert that cutting off their welfare benefits 
because of their failure to comply with the SSN requirement would 
be inconsistent with Congress' general intent to provide assist-
ance to all eligible recipients regardless of religious creed. 
Finally, appees urge, the DC's relief is not overbroad. Use 
of Little Bird of the Snow's SSN would directly and irreparably 
injure Roy in his religious beliefs • 
. . 
In their reply brief, appts respond that appees seriously 
' •
misstate appts' argument. Like the DC, appees fdcus solely on 
the number of persons who potentially might seek a religious ex-
emption from the SSN requirement. This approach ignores the 
larger "programmatic interests" served by the requirement. 
Appts' argument is that the government may be required to adopt a 
less restrictive alternative in the case of a particular plain-
tiff only if the government's programmatic interests would be 
served equally well by making that alternative applicable to the 
populace as a whole regardless of how many persons are likely 
to claim exemptions. 
4. DISCUSSION: Viewed in the context of the balancing ap-
proach the Court has used in its accommodation cases, appts' 
principal argument is nonsensical. Appts concede that few peopr.~ 
would be likely to claim exemptions from the SSN requirement on ~ 
the basis of either actual or feigned religious beliefs. If 
granting a religious exemption to a statutory requirement does 
not threaten the "programmatic interests" behind the requirement, 
then under a balancing approach those interests are irrelevant to 
the question whether the exemption must be granted. Under the 
balancing approach the Court has used, it is the restriction of 
religious liberty that itself must be essential to accomplishing 
a compelling governmental interest, not (as appts argue) the gen-
eral governmental program or requirement that causes the restric-
tion of liberty. See Bob Jones University v. United States, 103 
S.Ct. 2017, 2035 (1983): United States v. Lee, 455 U.S., at 257-
258. In Lee, the Court did consider the broader interests behind 
mandatory participation in the social security system, but only 
' 
because it perceived that granting religious exem~tions would 
significantly threaten those interests. See 455 u.s., at 260; 
id., at 263 {STEVENS, J., concurring in the judgment). 
Appts' argument thus makes sense only if viewed as a sugges-
tion that the Court reject the balancing approach it has previ-
"'---- '-- ---.___ ~ - "'-- " '-- "'-- ...__. '----'---- ' 
ously employed. From this perspective, the argument has merit. 
~ 
The government does have legitimate general interests in enforc-
ing facially neutral laws uniformly and in not being put to a 
choice between either acceding to or litigating every bizarre 
religious objection to an otherwise valid law. ~his position is 
v ~ 
similar to the views advanced by JUSTICES REHNQUIS~ and STEVENS. 
See Lee, 455 u.s., at 262, 263, n. 3 {STEVENS, J., concurring in 
the judgment); Thomas, 450 u.s., at 723 {REHNQUIST, J., dissent-
ing) • 
In any event, this case must at least be held for Jensen v. 
Quaring, No. 83-1944, which concerns a religiously motivated 
claim for exemption from Nebraska's photograph requirement for 
drivers' licenses. In terms of the nature of the plaintiffs' 
claims and of the governments' interests, the two cases are obvi-
ously very similar. Moreover, the government's interests in the 
instant case would appear to be stronger than those in Quaring, 
inasmuch as the Nebraska statute {unlike the federal statutes 
here) grants certain exemptions from the photograph requirement. 
Thus a victory for the state in Quaring would entail a reversal 
or remand in this case. 
Further, I believe that this case deserves ~lenary review on 
its own. Notwithstanding appts' concessions, on~ could argue 
hat the DC erred in applying the "traditional" balancing test by 
...:;:o...-~ _,_ 
ot adequately considering the economic incentive that its hold-
---~~~~
ing would create for welfare recipients or appli~ants to feign 
- ~~~""\..._. "'-
religious conversions in order to prevent government agencies --- ~ 
from identifying their files with unique numerical identifiers. 
Cf. Lee, 455 U.S., at 264, n.3 (STEVENS, J., concurring in the 
judgment). More significantly, the DC's unprecedented conclusion 
that the mere use by the government of Little Bird of the Snow's 
SSN would violate Roy's Free Exercise rights could have sweeping 
implications. Nothing in the DC's opinion qualifies or restricts 
this conclusion. I would imagine, therefore, that the Court 
would want at least to limit this part of the DC's holding. Fi-
nally, if the Court wishes to address directly the argument that 
the government is making here, this case offers a much stronger 
factual basis for the government's position than Quaring does, in 
that the statutes here do not permit exemptions. 
-------~--~~-------
I recommend NPJ. 
Appees have moved for leave to proceed IFP. IFP status ap-
pears to be proper. 
There is a motion to affirm, a "response" in support of the 
jurisdictional statement, and a reply brief. 
January 3, 1985 Lightsey Opn in juris. stmt. 
0 
alb 
TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Lee 
RE: No. 83-1944, Jensen v. Quaring 
This case was argued in January, and the Co 
voted 5-3 to reverse the judgment of CAS. 
opinion and a dissent circulated on May 24, Just' e Blackmun, 
originally a member of the majority, changed h's vote. 
Therefore, unless the case is reargued, it 
equally divided Court. As you will 
by an 
Chief has asked 
you to umove for reargument or vote when a motion is made-
-as it surely will be.u Although I a 
general drivers' 
licenses display a color picture of the licensee. There is no 
provision for individualized exemptions from the photograph 
requirement, and none has been made. The respondent here has 
passed the requisite written examination and driving test. 
Nevertheless, she cannot acquire a license because she has 
refused to be photographed. She sincerely believes that the 
1
' Second Commandment' prohibits the making or possession of _____..,. 
photographs .I Without a drivers' license, respondent is uable to 
.. . , 
manage her herd of cattle or to drive to a neighbdring town where · 
·'· I 
she has a part-time job as a bookkeeper. ~~ 
lo 
CA8 held that the State's failure to grant respondent a 
____.-? 
license violated her First Amendment right to the free exercise 
of religion. The court found that the State had placed a burden 
on the exercise of respondent's religious beliefs by conditioning 
receipt of an important benefit upon conduct forbidden by her 
beliefs. It held that petitioner could justify this restriction 
on respondent's religious liberty only by demonstrating that it 
was the least restrictive means of accomplishing a compelling 
state interest. The court concluded that because the State 
provides certain types of licenses without photographs (~, 
learner's permits), there was no compelling reason for denying 
selective exemptions based on religious objections to the license 
requirement. 
The Court opinion circulated by the Chief reverses the -- -judgment of CA8. The opinion states that the court below should 
not have applied the compelling state interest standard. 
Although th~ Court acknowledges that this standard should be used 
in a case where the challenged legislation makes a person's 
religious practices unlawful, it asserts that a different 
standard should be used when the statute imposes only an indirect 
------------------------------------~----~---------~------or incidental burden. When the burden is indirect, a "neutral 
~
and uniformly applicable" statute may be enforced if it 




The dissent points out that "once it has 'been shown that 
i 
'I 
a government regulation burdens the free exercise bf religion, 
this Court has consistently asked the government to demonstrate 
/ 1 ,, 
that ..• [it] represents 'the least restrictive means of 
achieving some compelling state interest.'" Dissent at 4, 
quoting Thomas v. Review Board, 450 u.s. 707, 718 (1981}. 
Applying this standard to the case at hand, the dissent concludes 
that "Nebraska's interests can be fully vindicated without 
burdening Mrs. Quaring's free exercise of religion." This 
conclusion is unremarkable, given the information submitted by 
respondent in a post-argument brief. On February 1, 1985, 
petitioner, the Director of the Nebraska Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 
testified before the state legislature in support of a bill to 
eliminate drivers' license photographs for budgetary reasons. 
She testified: "It's my feeling age, hair color, eye color, 
height and weight are enough to verify that this is the person 
holding the license." Governor Kerrey agreed, stating that 
elimination of the photograph is "not something that would 
interfere with law enforcement •••• " The dissent states that in 
light of this candid testimony, "the petitioners cannot credibly 
assert that issuing Mrs. Quaring a license with a written rather 
than photographic description undermines its overall program of 
driver identification or its goal of allowing only qualified 
drivers to operate a motor vehicle on the highways of Nebraska." 
The dissent is probably correct in asserting that the 
'b ~ Chief's approach constitutes a reak with precedent. In the 
past, the Court has required that a statute represent the least 
restrictive means of achieving a compelling state 1interest. See, 
. ~~ 
~' Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 u.s. 205 (1972); Thd&as v. Review 
,\ 
Board, 450 u.s. 707 (1980); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 u.s. 398 
(1963). The Chief's attempt to distinguish the prior cases is 
not very persuasive. First, he asserts that many of the earlier 
~-----------
cases have involved "affirmative compulsion or prohibition"--he 
contends that statutes imposing only an indirect burden are 
different. But this Court always has refused to distinguish 
between direct and indirect burdens. See Sherbert, supra, and 
Thomas, supra. It makes little sense to say that a state may not 
impose a $100 fine on church-goers, but that it may give $100 to 
all persons who do not attend church. Second, the Chief does not 
explain adequately why Sherbert and Thomas, cases involving 
indirect burdens, are distinguishable. It does not seem to me 
that a different standard should be invoked here simply because 
the Nebraska statute does not have a "mechanism for 
individualized exemptions." 
with 
Although the Chief's approach seems to be inconsistent ~ 
prior decisions of this Court, I am not u~sympa~is 0 \ 
view. With the proliferation of different religious sects, ~ -
government regulation increasingly will place indirect burdens on 
-;. 
the free exercise of religion. Perhaps all the Court should ·- ----require is that laws 
applicable, with no intent to discriminate against particular 
------·-- -------------~--~ 
religious beliefs or against religion in general. Four Justices 
----
---------(CJ, BRW, WHR, and JPS) ave now adopted this position. 
I 
1 




for resolving Free Exercise claims, at least when ~!he challenged 
government action imposes only an indirect burden on the 
religion. Therefore, the Court probably should consider another 
Free Exercise case in the near future. Jensen may be a good 
vehicle for addressing the First Amendment issue because the 
battle lines already are well-drawn. If you decide that the 
compelling state interest standard is appropriate, I believe that 
you will ~e able to join Justice O'Connor's decision "as is." If 
you wait for another case, and then decide to stick with 
precedent, the Court may be fragmented. It is very likely that 
there will be some disagreement among you, so•c, WJB, TM, and HAB 
over whether the refusal to make a religious exemption is 
justified by a "compelling state interest." If you decide to 
adopt the Chief's position, of course, it will make little 
difference what case the Court takes. 
The Chief's letter mentioned another case that was held 
for Jensen, Heekber-v. Roy, - No. 84-1944. I am surprised that the 
Chief does not want to hear that case rather than have Jensen 
reargued. In Roy, the appellees refused to comply with a -- ---
requirement that participants in two federal programs (AFDC and 
Food Stamps) furnish the responsible state agencies with the 
social security numbers of household members. The appellees, 
American Indians, believe that the repeated use of their 
daughter's social security number will "rob her of her spirit." 
This belief apparently is derived "[p]artly from intuition, 
partly from hearing other Abenaki Indians speak, [and] partly 
from what [the appellants] read about religious teachings." The 
~':I 
DC for the MD of Pa held that the SSN requirement ~blaced an .......---
impermissible burden on appellants' First Amendment right to 
freely exercise their religion. 
/ 
In Roy, the DC made the following findings: 
[1] The social security number is an important tool of 
federal and state agencies to reduce the misdirection 
of benefits in the food stamp and AFDC programs. 
[2] Studies by HHS indicate overpayments of $25,000,000 
on an annual basis while USDA has estimated that, in 
fiscal year 1981, $1,000,000 in benefits were 
attributable to payments to persons ineligible for the 
program overpayments to eligible persons. 
[3] The efficient operation of these programs requires 
the use of computer systems that utilize unique 
numerical identifiers such as the social security 
number. 
Given these findings, I believe that you could vote to reverse 
ven if you adhere to the "compelling state interest" standard. 
If the Chief wants to minimize the probability that he will be 
writing a dissent next year, he should let Jensen go and vote to 
probable jurisdiction in Roy. 
If I can do anything else to help you decide what to do 
about these two cases, please let me know. 
.' 
June 4, 1985 f-1_,. 1 /() 
83-1944 Jensen v. Quaring 
Dear Chief: 
This refers to your letter inquiring whether I 
would move to reargue this case. As I havA not taken any 
part in the cases that ~~ere argued dur i.ng my absence, I 
think it best for me not to depart from this precedent. You 
may remember, also, that when Bill Rehnquist ann I came on 
the Court similar questions arose and we declined to vote 
for rehearings. ~he only exception was in the abortion 
cases when we talked t:o Harry Blackmun and found that he 
preferred a rearqumPnt. He wanted additional time during 
the summer to work on an opinion. 
I am puzzl~d that: you had rather have Jensen rear-
guerl than to note in Heckler v. Roy, 84-1944 - a case being 
held for Jensen. I will qladly vote to note orobabJe iuris-
cHction in Rov. It oresents substiinti.allv the same question 
involving a claimed religious belief of American Indians. I 
believe that the chances of your views prevailing would be 
at least as good - if not better. - in Rov than on reargument 
of Jensen. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
'1 •• of~· 
-
June 13, 1985 
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ABSENT NOT VOTING 
G D 
lfp/ss 12/27/85 ROY SALLY-POW 
84-780 Heckler v. Roy (DC Pa.) 
(Argument, January 14, 1986) 
MEMO TO CABELL: 
Following our discussion this morning, I have 
taken a quick look at the case. I think the decision of 
the DC is dead wrong, though I can understand how the 
application of the "least restrictive means" prong of the 
standard can be argued as it was resolved by the DC. 




requiring that recipients of Social Security benefits be 
identified by Social Security numbers is compelling. 
Although respondent now argues that under the facts of the 
case the government's interest is not compelling (citing 
Thomas v. Review Board and Sherbert v. Verner) , I would 
have no difficulty in agreeing that the interest is 
compelling. 
Whether the "means" employed namely the 
requirement of identification numbers - meets the "least 
restrictive" inquiry may be more difficult. The 
government argues rather persuasively that the use of 
identifying numbers is essential to verify eligibility, 
prevent and detect fraud, and promote efficient 
,· 
\.__.,.' 
.. ~ . 
l. 
administration of the massive Social Security programs. 
No less restrictive and effective means has been 
identified. 
The DC and appellees argue that the numbers 
because really aren 1 t necessary in cases like this one 
very few religious sects will hold the same or similar 
views as those of the Roy family, namely, that 
computerized numbers violate their religious beliefs based 
on the "legend of Katahdin". In other words, the DC - and 
again appellees - make the argument that where only a few 
people hold particular religious beliefs (with the result 
that the amount of fraud will not be great) their First 
Amendment religious rights merit protection. The 
corollary to this argument is that where a large number of 
people hold some particular religious belief, thereby 
increasing the administrative burden and enhancing the 
likelihood of fraud, a restriction of religious beliefs 
may be justified. As the SG 1 s brief observes, this 
argument "defies common sense". 
You might take a look, Cabell, at Lee Bentley 1 s 
memo to me of June 6 in 83-1944 Jensen v. Quaring 
(attached to the papers in this case) in which Lee thinks 
that we could decide this type of case on the ground that 
.:S. 
requirements such as this, involving millions of people, 
may be sustained if they are facially neutral and 
uniformly applied with no intent to discriminate against 
particular religious beliefs or against religion in 
general. Lee notes that four Justices (the CJ, BRW, WHR 
and JPS) have adopted this position. I am not sure about 
JPS, and the CJ's opinion in Jensen- that did not command 
a Court - did not adopt this line of reason. It does have 
appeal to me. 
1 have not taken a look at any of the cases, but 
the one I had in mind when we spoke - and that I could not 
identify is United States v. Lee, 455 u.s. 252. It 
involved an Amish claim for an exemption from paying 
Social Security taxes, and may be helpful if I vote - as I 
am inclined to do - to reverse the DC. 
I do note, Cabell, that the appellee's brief 
written by the Pennsylvania Civil Liberties Union (and 
therefore well written) makes a new argument, namely, that 
the decision below may be affirmed on statutory grounds. 
See the summary of this argument on p. 7 of appellee's 
brief. 1 would appreciate your views as to this. 







and 1 do not recall it being argued. 1 t is not included 
in the question presented. 
In sum, Cabell - as you indicated - it may be 
easier to affirm than to reverse the DC if one relies 
strictly on the formalistic type of analysis found it many 
of our prior cases. But where massive federal government 
programs are involved (the SG says that nearly 4 million 
families are receiving AFDC payments each month, involving 
some 11 million persons and billions of dollars), it 
sense to start down the road of exempting 
from the quite simple requirement of an identification 
number, each person who claims to belong to some of the __........ 
now numerous and apparently increasing number of 
religious beliefs and sects. 
But apart from my simmering sense of impatience 
with claims like this one I would like your independent 
judgment. 1 would particularly like for you to suggest 
how we can best frame a test that will attract the votes 
of four other Justices. The key vote may well be John 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell January 2, 1986 
From: Cabell 
No. 84-780, Heckler v. Roy 
~ from D Pa. (Muir, J.) 
Tuesday, January 14 (1st case) ., 
Question Presented 
Did the district court err in exempting appellees, who 
hold a sincere religious belief that social security numbers are 
a great evil, from the requirement that recipients of Aid to Fam-
ilies with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Food Stamps must provide 
the government with their social security numbers? 
BACKGROUND ·' I 
·1 
Appellees are the parents of the infant Little Bird of 
the Snow. They subscribe to a religious belief that the use of 
~ 
social security numbers (SSNs) by governmental agencies compro-
mises the individuality of a believer and robs the spirit. This 
belief apparently is an amalgam of Native American religious tra-
dition, legend, and appellees' intuition. 
Appellee Karen Miller, the mother, applied for and re-
ceived a SSN for Little Bird. Little Bird's father, a Native 
American, cautioned against providing the SSN to governmental 
agencies. Accordingly, appellees declined to provide the SSN 
when a case reviewer at the Pennsylvania Department of Public 
Welfare discovered that Little Bird's application lacked the num-
ber. See 42 u.s.c. § 602(a) (25) and 7 u.s.c. § 2025(e), requir-
ing participants in AFDC and Food Stamp programs to furnish SSNs 
to state welfare agencies. As a result, the agency term ina ted 
the AFDC benefits for Little Bird and instituted proceedings for 
a pro-rata decrease in the family's Food Stamp benefits. 
Appellees brought suit in the District of Pennsylvania 
against the State Department of Welfare, the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services, and the Secretary of the Department of Agri-
culture, challenging the constitutionality of the SSN requirement 
as applied to them. At trial, appellees introduced evidence con-
cerning their religious beliefs, and the defendants introduced 
evidence explaining the purposes of the SSN requirement in the 




At the conclusion of trial, the district ,court (Muir, 
I 
J.) made fi~ct,.~ including the following: 'f 
11 69. The use of computer 'cross-matching' can sig-
nificantly reduce erroneous payments in these [Social 
Security and AFDC] programs . 






Requiring social security numbers for children 
the agencies' ability to detect non-existent 
on the basis of cross-matches with school en-
and other files. 
.. 74. Without the provision of social security num-
bers in these programs, cross-matching would be more 
difficult to perform ... 
The district court concluded, however, that failure to 
provide a social security number would not .. render cross matching 
impossible ... 
---, Therefore, the district court upheld appellees' 
objection to the use of Little Bird 's SSN, granted them relief 
from the SSN requirement, and enjoined the defendants from deny-
ing benefits for Little Bird and from disseminating Little Bird's 
already established SSN. 
11. DISCUSSION 
A. Both parties characterize the proper legal test as 
the .. compelling state interest - least restrictive alternative .. 
test: infringement by the government on the exercise of religious 
freedom is permissible only if the government is motivated by a 
_____. 
compelling interest and its infringement is the least restrictive 
alternative. Debate here centers on whether the .. least ~estric-
tive means .. should be determined by looking at the individual 





1 find th_~_l-;q.t-t_t_e_r_l_· s _ _the 
I· i 
B. Lee Bentley's memo of June 6, 1985, proposes that 
the Court decide the case on a more restrictive First Amendment 
~est than the Court has adopted before. Under the suggested 
~ standard, a requirement would be upheld if it is facially neutral 
and uniformly applied without intent to discriminate against re-
lig ious beliefs. 1 agree that this standard has great appeal, 
and there may be a majority to support this idea. Justice Ste-
vens has expressed his support for placing an "almost insuperable 
obstacle" in the way of a citizen who objects to a "valid and 
neutral law generally applied." 
,-- ?t..of-~~ 
c. The statutory basis for affirming proposed by appel-
lees breaks down upon closer inspection. The provisions cited by 
appellees are general "non-discrimination" sections that prohibit 
direct interference with the exercise of religion. They do not 
answer the ultimate question here of whether the SSN requirement 
infringes on appellee's free exercise of religion. 
A. Least Restrictive Means Test 
Both sides agree that the proper legal _.test - at least -----
as the case law currently stands - is that the government must 
have a compelling need and must employ the least restrictive 
means of meeting the need. The r~ebat3 centers over whether 
that analysis should focus on an individual petition for an ex-
ception8 on 
population of 
the administration of the program to the entire 
beneficiaries. 1 t is of course easier to prove 
-'• 
that there is a "less restrictive means" available in administer-
1 
ing only one person's benefits than in overseeing a program hav-
ing 383 million accounts. 
The district court's opinion stated that the analysis 
would consider "the Plaintiffs' interests as against the govern-
ment 's interest in this particular case as well as the govern-
ment 's interest in the social security number requirement as a 
general matter." Jurisdictional Statement 18a. 1 do not know 
what weights the district court would have assigned to these in-
terests, and the district court never reached the "government's 
interest" in the SSN requirement "as a general matter." For ex-
ample, in talking about interstate matching (a "general" con-
cern), the district court stated: "In any event, assuming that 
such cross-matching is impossible, the possibility that Little 
Bird of the Snow or some other individual could fraudulently ob-
tain welfare benefits in two different states or in some other 
interstate context as a result of exempting Little Bird of the 
Snow from the social security number requirement in this case is 
extremely remote" (emphasis added). 
The SG argues that the least restrictive means should be 
assessed with respect to the program as a whole, not by a case-
by-case analysis. As your memo of December 27th states, although 
members of a tiny sect may obtain an exclusion under the district 
court's reasoning, "[t]he corollary to this argument is that 
where a large number of people hold some particular religious 
belief, thereby increasing the administrative burden and enhanc-
.. 
ing the likelihood of fraud, a restriction of reli~ious beliefs 
i may be justified ... 
The logical support for asssessing the least restrictive 
means with respect to the administration of the ~~ ntire program~(a 
------------~------..____ ~ · 7 
,.programmatic test 11 ) ~ar, but the leg~not. The 
SG argues the legality of its ,.programmatic,. test by analogy to 
some tax cases, where the Court allegedly rejected the proposi-
tion ,.that religious exemptions to the payment of taxes should be 
granted unless the government is able to show that even a few 
such exemptions would cause the income tax system to collapse ... 
Appellant's Brief 30. That reading is overbroad. The Court held 
that the 11 tax system could not function if denominations were 
allowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments were 
spent in a manner that violates their religious beliefs ... United 
/ States v. Lee, 455 u.s. 252, 260 (1982). 1 have been unable to 
find firm support for the ,.programmatic test,. in the Court's free 
exercise cases. Perhaps this limitation has contributed to the 
Court's impatience in this area and some Justices' search for a 
different standard. --------
B. A F Uniforml 
o of June 6 pro that a legislature 
can advance a compelling governmental interest through uniform 
application of a facially neutral requirement, even if the re-
quirement infringes upon some religious beliefs. Your memo has 
specifically asked about the views of Justice Stevens and the 
Chief Justice. 
I • 
?-.a. )1 £, 
/ I 
Lee, supra, charac,terized the Justice Stevens, in 
Court's holding as "a standard that places an almos J insurmount-
able burden on any individual who objects to a valid and neutral 
law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscrib-
ers (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or pro-
scribes)." Id., at 263 n. 3. Justice Stevens also believes that 
"there is virtually no room for a 'constitutionally required ex-
emption' on religious grounds from a valid tax law that is en-
tirely neutral in its general application." Id., at 263. Other 
language in footnote three suggests that Justice Stevens would 
vote for the "valid and neutral law of general applicability" 
outside of tax cases. 
You have also wondered about the Chief Justice's posi-
tion on the "facially neutral and uniformly applicable" standard. 
v 
I have obtained a copy of the Jensen draft from the Super Clerk, ~ 
,.,..~ 
that a compelling state interest 1 . • and there the Chief argues 
~j' 
person's 
where challenged legislati n makes a 
unlawful. Where, as here, the stat- 0 
ute imposes only an indirect or incidental burden, the Chief has 
suggested that a "neutral and uniformly applicable" statute may 
be enforced if it represents "reasonable means of promoting a 
legitimate public interest" (his words). 
As the dissent in the Jensen draft and Lee Bentley have 
pointed out, this approach is an arguably break with the Court's 
past free exercise cases. I am, however, sympathetic with these 
views, especially in the light of the proliferation of religious 
sects and the increasingly great number of perceived "intrusions" 
Vo 
I 
into their beliefs {who would have thought SSNs were a great 
l, 
evil?) . 
c. Affirmance on Statutory Grounds UA> - J/L. h.-~ \ 1 , ~~~~~~----~ "\ 
The appellees have argued that thi~an affirm the 
district court's decision on the strength of various statutory 
provisions that either prohibit welfare agencies from denying 
benefits on the basis of religion or afford religious protections 
explicitly to Native Americans. See 42 u.s.c. § 2000d; 7 u.s.c. 
§ 2020 {c). 
Appellees first attempt to undercut the force of the 
provisions requiring SSNs. Appellees correctly point out that 
the overriding goal of the AFDC and Food Stamp programs was to 
provide for impoverished families. See 42 u.s.c. § 601 and 7 
u.s.c. § 2011. The SSN requirement in AFDC has, inter alia, been 
a means of an optional search for an absentee father, and the 
payment of benefits was not, and is not, conditioned upon the 
mother's active assistance in this search. It does not follow, 
as appellees argue, that the payments are also not conditioned on 
the provision of a SSN. The explicit terms of the statute indi-
cate otherwise. Moreover, even if true, this argument does not 
address the Food Stamp program's SSN requirement. 
In 1981 Congress changed the Food Stamp program's SSN 
provision from "The Secretary •.. may {1) require" to "The Sec-
retary shall { 1) require" SSNs. See 7 U.S .c. § 2025 {e) . 
Appellees denigrate the provision because it was part of a farm-
ing bill with price supports, but Food Stamps are under the De-
I 
partment of Agriculture. Appellants concede that tbe change was 
II 
1'1 
part of an effort "focused on preventing abuse of the program." 
Appellees' Brief 13. Therefore 1 believe this provision, like 
the AFDC requirement, is entitled to its ordinary meaning that 
recipients must provide their SSNs. 
The statutory provisions within the AFDC and Food Stamps 
programs that appellees cite in support of their free exercise 
claim (prohibiting denial of benefits on the basis of religion) 
are general statements enjoining those who administer the pro-
grams from discriminating on the basis of race, sex, religious 
creed, national origin, or political beliefs. Such statutory 
ernment funds or services, and Title 42 has at least five analo-
gous provisions for fair housing, disaster assistance, non-
nuclear research and development, community economic development, 
and Head Start. 
1 consider these provisions statutory boilerplate. 1 
believe these provisions encompass only a direct denial because 
of reigion, and do not address cases like this one, where a stat-
ute's effect is only indirect. To rely on these provisions as a 
means of deciding the case simply begs the question of whether _____.. 
appellees have been denied benefits "on the basis" of their reli-
gion. Moreover, to affirm on these provisions would open up a 
~ host of religious challenges. Future litigants could argue that 
other requirements have an indirect upon their free exercise of 
religion, and thereby constitute a denial of benefits in contra-
vention of statute. 
'I' 
..LVo 




gious beliefs expresses a policy of "protect [ ing] and preserv-
to 
42 
u.s.c. § 1996. The unusually complete legislative history states 
that the provision was enacted to countermand government regula-
tions that interfered with "traditional Indian rites" (~, pre-
venting the Indians from entering sacred glades because of cer-
tain tourist regulations; confiscating ancient eagle head dresses 
because of wildlife conservation regulations; prohibiting use of 
peyote in ceremonies because of the substance's use in cities as 
a halluc inigen) • I believe that this provision is i 
to the present case because § 1996, on its face, covers only tra-
~--
ditional religions: appellees' religion is from their "intu-
~
ition." Moreover, the provision is meant to cover only obviously 
needless interference with religious beliefs from an unanticipat-
ed application of regulations. For example, the legislative his-
tory refers to the confiscation, under color of wildlife conser-
vation laws, of certain tribal skins and artifacts even though 
these artifacts were obtained long before the enactment of the 
the statute. The legislative history suggests that Indians would 
not be permitted today to kill an endangered species. I there-





reading of the cases would,·( 




is wrong. This Court should reverse either on the basis of a 
"programmatic compelling need" or on the basis of a standard sim-
ilar to the Chief's "facially neutral, uniformly applied" stand-
ard. 
January 2, 1986 Cabell Bench Mem. 
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CHAMBERS OF 
~ttprtmt <lJltnri of t!tt ~tb .i'tattg 
Jlagittnghtn. ~. OJ. 20bf~~ 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
March 12, 1986 
84-780 - Bowen v. Roy 
Dear Chief, 
I shall await the dissent in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
Jn.vrtntt QIDttrl d tqt lfuittb .:italt.tr 
Jla,g£rington, ~. <q. 211~'!~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR 
March 14, 1986 
No. 84-780 Bowen v. Roy 
Dear Chief, 
I plan to write a dissent in this case and 
will circulate something within two or three weeks if 
all goes well. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
~ .. 
CHAMI!IERS OF" 
jtu;rrtntt <!fourt of tqt~b ,jbdte 
'llaslfington. ~. <If. 20p'!-~ 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
March 14, 1986 
Re: No. 84-780-Bowen v. Roy 
Dear Chief: 




The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
, .. 
'. 
.iu:prmtt OJttnri of tl{t ~tb _itaftg 
.. Mfringhm. ~. Qf. 211,?~$ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
Re: No. 84-780 Bowen v. Roy 
Dear Chief, 
Please join me. 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
. 
, ~ \ '\ 
/ 
March 14, 1986 
Sincerely, 
[A)lP'./ 
March 17, 1986 





I have now had the opportunity to review your draft 
in this case. 1 am in agreem~nt with your baRic position, 
but have concerns that t share with you privately. 
The draft identifies several grounds for reversing 
the District Court. It does emphasize a "facially neutral, 
uniformly applicable" test, first articulated on page 5. As 
you later point out on page 9, a neutral and uniformly ap-
plicable statute may be enforced if it represents a reason-
able means of promoting a legitimate public interest. 1 am 
in agreement. This test provides the Court with a stanoard 
that protects religious free~om without hamqtringing the 
government in the face of the proliferation of religious 
sects and the increasingly great number of perceived "intru-
sions" into religious freedom. 
I would not state alternate tests. Reltance on the 
wholly neutral nature of the Social Security number resolves 
this case. The "benefits vs. prohibition" test mentioned on 
pages 6-8 is unnecessary, and also raises questions for me. 
lt may well be that a "denial of governmental benefits" 
sometimes could constitute an "infringement of religious 
liberty." Moreover, although it may be true that denial of 
benefits is less intrusive than affirmative compulsion or 
prohibition, 1 do not think that necessarily answers the 
question in this case. 
1 agree generally with your discussion of Yoder, 
Thomas, and Sherbert, and with your emphasis on pages 10-12 
of the Social Security numbers' importance in the computer-
assisted administration of a large and complex program. 
Sincerely, 
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.. . \ 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CH IEF JUSTICE 
~u.prmtt (!fourl of tlrt ,-mub ~taftg 
Jfagfringhtn.!D. <!f. 2llgt~~ 
March 27, 1986 
RE: No. 84-780 -- Bowen v. Roy 
Dear Lewis: 
Thank you for your memo on this case. I believe I am in 
general accord with your views that denial of government benefits 
may sometimes constitute an infringement of religious liberty. I 
have added language in the revised draft to make this view 
explicit. See page 8. 
The reason for discussing the fact that this is a benefits 
case, not a criminal sanctions case, is to focus the op1n1on 
narrowly on the precise question presented. I am concerned that 
removing that limitation might unduly expand the holding, to the 
ultimate detriment of Free Exercise claimants. In other words, 
the facially neutral nature of the provisions at issue here 
combined with the fact that this is a benefits case~ produce the 
result. I do not intend to suggest that one without the other 
would "necessarily answer the case," and I think the opinion is 
clear on this point. I have, however, added discussion 
concerning the Bob Jones Universit~ case, which I hope will 
satisfy your concern that the opin1on creates some kind of new 
"benefits v. prohibition" "test". Seep. 8. I have also added 
modifying language to statements that might appear to discuss 
benefits alone. See p. 6. 
Since I think we are in general agreement on the issues 
here, I hope you will join. I will, as always, be happy to 








..JUSTICE w .. . ..J . BRENNAN, ..JR. 
March 28, 1986 
No. 84-780 
Bowen v. Roy, et al. 
Dear Sandra, 





Copies to the Conference 
CHAMI!IE:RS o.-
iltWrttnt <!fourt of tqt ~b ,jtatte 
'llhte!rington. ~. <If. 2ll,S"~ 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL March 31, 1986 
Re: No. 84-780 - Bowen v. Roy 
Dear Sandra: 





cc: The Conference 
. ' 
April 3, 1986 
84-780 Bowen v. Roy 
Dear Chief: 
PleaRe join me. 
Sincerely, 
~he Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 








JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~mu Qj:onrl of Hr~ ~nittb ,jtatts 
-as~ ~. Qj:. 211~"'" 
Memorandum to the Conference 
:j 
April 11, 1986 
9~~ 
:;:~ 
No. 84-780, Bowen v. Rol ~ ~ 
Although John has not ye:_t::,_..:::e..!!x~..&.to'-~~ h~inal t._ 1-
Re: 
evident that we are all r the 
assumption that John w' 
advisable to have a ief 
used on other occasion • 
The for your c 
"The judgment of the District Court is vacated and 
the case remanded. THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE BLACKMUN, 
JUSTICE POWELL, JUSTICE REHNQUIST, and JUSTICE STEVENS 
agree that the Government's use, dissemination, and con-
tinued possession of the social security number it al-
ready possesses for appellees' daughter should not be 
enjoined, and that the remainder of the relief ordered by 
the District Court should also be vacated. If, however, 
it becomes evident at any further hearing that appellees' 
religious convictions still prevent them from supplying 
the Government with a social security number for their 
daughter, JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE WHITE, JUSTICE MAR-
SHALL, JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE O'CONNOR agree that, 
on the facts as determined by the District Court, the 
Government should be enjoined from denying assistance to 
appellees' daughter for that reason." 
Of course, this would have to be modified if it does not reflect 
John's views. 
I trust · I am not regarded as being officious in suggesting 
something of this kind. 
.iuJJUmt (ij.rurt Gf tlrt ~b i'bdte 
'llhte~n. ~. (ij. 2.llpl!~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
May 1, 1986 
Re: No. 84-780-Bowen v. Roy 
Dear Sandra: 





cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS 01' 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
., 
jbpttm:t Ql&mri nf tltt ~nittlt i'tatt• 
Jlulfiq~ ~. Ql. 20~~' 
May 9, 1986 
Re: 84-780 - Bowen v. Roy 
Dear Chief: 
With respect t~ your reworking of Part II, I 
will not only "salute" you; I will join you. With 
respect to Part III, however, I remain unpersuaded 
that the remaining issue--what the government can 
require when it already has the social security 
number it seeks--is ripe for review. Perhaps the 
answer to the hypothetical question that the record 
does not present is so easy that it is appropriate to 
go ahead and discuss it, but I am inclined to think 
that when there is a significant disagreement within 
the Court on such an issue--even when the answer 
appears obvious to the respective disputants--the 
better practice is to avoid the unnecessary 
discussion of constitutional issues. I shall 
therefore recast the second part of my separate 
writing and merely join your Parts I and II. 
Respectfully, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
t •·· 
' v 
May 10, 1986 
84-780 Bowen v. Roy 
Dear Chief: 
This refers to your revised Fifth Draft of an 
opinion for the Court. 1 am still with you. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justic~ 
lf.p/ss 
cc: The Conference 
,. 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.iu.prnnt Ofltttri d tlft ,-mttb .itzdts-
-as-lfi:nghm.. ~. Of. 20.;t~~ 
May 13, 1986 
Re: No. 84-780 Bowen v. Roy 
Dear Chief, 
I am still with you. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
"'·.'' 
,juvrtmt <!fourt ttf tqt ~ittlt Jtatt.s- '· 
Jlufrittgton. ~.Of. 2ll~~~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
,, 
May 14, 1986 
No. 84-780 Bowen v. Roy 
Dear Chief, 
You have made a number of changes in your 
opinion in this case and I intend to make some changes 
in my opinion as a result. Because I will attend the 
Sixth Circuit Conference this week in Memphis, I need 
to have the case held over another week to have time 
to spend on the changes I want to make. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
.-upunu '4qurl qf ut~ Jtni~ iltat~• 
'~ll'ziUY.lfittghnt. ~. '4. 2.tJ.?)l.~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
June 5, 1986 
Re: 84-780 - Bowen v. Roy 
Dear Sandra: 
In response to y~ur latest circulation, I am adding the 
following footnote at the end of my opinion: 
Although both THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE 
O'CONNOR explain why they believe the case is not moot, 
neither explains why it is ripe. JUSTICE O'CONNOR also 
incorrectly states that I believe the case should be 
remanded. JUSTICE O'CONNOR's error may reflect the 
difficulties that inhere when one Justice takes it upon 
herself or himself to explain the views of the Justices 
who have not joined the writer's opinion. Cf. 
California v. Sierra Club, 451 u.s. 287, 301, n. 5 
(1981) (STEVENS, J., concurring) ("'it is hardly 
necessary to state that only a majority can speak for 
the Court' or give an authoritative explanation of the 




Copies to the Conference 
-., ·*" 
'' 
84-780 Bowen v. Roy (Cabell) 
CJ for the Court 1/25/86 
1st draft 3/10/86 
2nd draft 3/11/86 
3rd draft 3/29/86 
4th draft 4/10/86 
5th draft 5/9/86 
6th draft 5/29/86 
Joined by WHR 3/14/86 
LFP 4/3/86 
Another join WHR 5/13/86 
SOC dissenting 
1st draft 3/25/86 
2nd draft 4/1/86 
3rd draft 5/1/86 
4th draft 5/22/86 
5th draft 6/5/86 
Joined by WJB 3/28/86 
soc 3/31/86 
BRW dissenting 
1st draft 4/8/86 
HAB. concurring in the judgment in part 
1st draft 4/11/86 
2nd draft 4/23/86 
4th draft 5/24/86 
5th draft 5/30/86 
JPS concurring in the judgment 
1st draft 4/22/86 
2nd draft 4/25/86 
4th draft 5/27/86 
BRW will dissent 3/12/86 
SOC will dissent 3/14/86 
TM awaiting dissent 3/14/86 
'•. 
''· 
